Evidence from surveys of price-setting managers: Policy lessons and directions for ongoing research by Vítor Gaspar et al.
Estudos e Documentos de Trabalho
Working Papers
27 | 2009
EVIDENCE FROM SURVEYS OF PRICE-SETTING MANAGERS:






The analyses, opinions and findings of these papers represent the views of the authors,
they are not necessarily those of the Banco de Portugal or the Eurosystem.
Please address correspondence to
Fernando Martins
Economics and Research Department
Banco de Portugal, Av. Almirante Reis no. 71, 1150-012 Lisboa, Portugal;
Tel.: 351 21 313 0378, fmartins@bportugal.ptBANCO DE PORTUGAL
Edition
Economics and Research Department






Documentation, Editing and Museum Division
Editing and Publishing Unit











Legal Deposit No 3664/83Evidence from surveys of price-setting managers: Policy lessons and 
directions for ongoing research 




Understanding the determinants of individual price setting behaviour is crucial for the 
formulation of monetary policy, especially in an economy experiencing ongoing structural 
change. These behavioural mechanisms play a fundamental role in influencing the 
characteristics of aggregate inflation and in determining how monetary policy affects inflation 
and real economic activity. Thus, this line of research can strengthen the conceptual foundations 
of general equilibrium models with sticky prices, enabling these models to provide monetary 
policymakers with an increasingly useful framework for interpreting and forecasting the 
evolution of the macroeconomy. 
In this paper, we introduce the Walrasian model as a benchmark for comparison, and we 
discuss the extent to which recent micro evidence on firms’ price setting behavior provides 
significant support for some basic elements of the New Keynesian perspective. We then proceed 
to analyze the implications of the micro evidence in distinguishing between competing theories 
of price stickiness. Finally, the paper concludes with some brief reflections about the lessons for 
monetary policy. 
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Understanding the determinants of individual price setting behavior is crucial for the 
formulation of monetary policy, especially in an economy experiencing ongoing structural 
change. These behavioral mechanisms play a fundamental role in influencing the characteristics 
of aggregate inflation and in determining how monetary policy affects inflation and real 
economic activity. Thus, this line of research can strengthen the conceptual foundations of 
general equilibrium models with sticky prices, enabling these models to provide monetary 
policymakers with an increasingly useful framework for interpreting and forecasting the 
evolution of the macroeconomy. 
These considerations provided a strong impetus for the Inflation Persistence Network 
(IPN), a collaborative research effort of the national central banks of the Eurosystem together 
with the European Central Bank (ECB). Fabiani, Loupias, Martins and Sabbatini (2007) provides 
a comprehensive report on the surveys of price setting managers that were conducted in nine euro 
area countries, covering a total of roughly 11,000 firms. In addition, as described in chapter 14 of 
Fabiani et al. (2007), the IPN analyzed a number of huge panel datasets of individual price 
records used in constructing producer as well as consumer price indices. Clearly, these two 
sources provide complementary types of information: the micro price data provides a means of 
quantifying individual price setting behavior, and the survey data facilitates the development of 
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coherent explanations for those findings. Taken together, these two data sources represent a 
unique opportunity to document and interpret the characteristics of individual price setting 
behavior in the euro area. Furthermore, the breadth and scope of this evidence is unprecedented 
by international standards, with coverage that goes well beyond the data available for the United 
States or any other industrial economy
5. The main results on price setting coming from the 
analysis of these data sources are summarized in the introduction of Fabiani et al. (2007). 
In this paper, we introduce the Walrasian model as a benchmark for comparison, and we 
discuss the extent to which recent micro evidence provides significant support for some basic 
elements of the New Keynesian perspective. We then proceed to analyze the implications of the 
micro evidence in distinguishing between competing theories of price stickiness. Finally, we 
conclude with some brief reflections about the lessons for monetary policy and potentially fruitful 
directions for further research. 
1. The Walrasian Benchmark 
The Walrasian model provides an invaluable benchmark for understanding resource 
allocation and price determination in general equilibrium
6. This model provides us with a 
precisely formulated set of conditions under which the equilibrium allocation of goods and 
services emerges as the outcome of a decentralized price mechanism—the “invisible hand” of 
Adam Smith. For example, the Walrasian model assumes that all markets are perfectly 
competitive and that every agent has the same information about the economy; furthermore, all 
prices adjust freely and continuously without any cost to ensure the equilibration of supply and 
demand of every product at every moment in time. 
In general terms, the Walrasian model demonstrates that the price mechanism is capable, at 
least in principle, of yielding a resource allocation that satisfies some basic normative criteria. In 
particular, the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics indicates that every competitive 
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equilibrium is Pareto-optimal; that is, no individual’s welfare can be strictly improved without a 
decline in someone else’s welfare. Indeed, with some additional regularity conditions, it can also 
be shown that all Pareto-optimal resource allocations can be decentralized as competitive 
equilibria. 
Of course, the assumptions underlying the Walrasian model are highly stylized and hence 
open to debate. For example, Fisher (1972) emphasized that the Walrasian framework “describes 
nobody’s actual behavior in most markets.” Okun (1981) argued that “models that focus on price-
takers and auctioneers and that assume continuous clearing of the market generate inaccurate 
microeconomics as well as misleading macroeconomics.” and Kreps (1990) stressed that the 
Walrasian model provides no description of “who sets prices, or what gets exchanged for what, 
when and where.” 
Thus, it is essential to determine the extent to which the Walrasian framework provides a 
useful description of the actual economy. Perhaps it is not surprising that some specific 
assumptions can be relaxed without causing the resource allocation to deviate substantially from 
the benchmark of Pareto optimality
7. 
2. Support for the “New Neoclassical Synthesis” and “New Keynesian” Perspectives 
Stimulated by Lucas’ (1976) critique of the existing crop of structural macroeconomic 
models, the subsequent research agenda of “New Neoclassical Synthesis” or “New Keynesian” 
economics have sought to provide more rigorous microeconomic foundations for the existence of 
nominal rigidities. These foundations explicitly consider the decision-making problems of firms 
and consumers in the context of specific departures from the Walrasian benchmark. The recent 
micro evidence provides significant support for two fundamental elements of such an approach, 
namely, the infrequent adjustment of prices and the role of imperfectly competitive markets. 
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2.1 The Prices of Many Goods and Services Are Adjusted Relatively Infrequently 
The micro evidence for the euro area indicates that retail and producer prices are only 
adjusted about twice a year on average. Of course, the prices of some items—such as automobile 
fuel, fresh fruits, and unprocessed meat—do change on a daily or weekly basis. In contrast, the 
prices of all other retail goods (excluding food and energy) have an average duration of about ten 
months, and the prices of consumer services typically remain unchanged for a year or longer. 
Indeed, as described in Fabiani et al. (2007), surveys of price setting behavior (in the euro area as 
well as other industrial economies) have consistently found that a majority of firms tend to adjust 
the price of their main product no more than once a year. 
The relatively infrequent adjustment of retail and producer prices is particularly striking in 
contrast to the evolution of the macroeconomy, which exhibits continually changing levels of 
aggregate spending, employment, raw materials prices, asset prices, and so forth. Thus, in 
contrast to the Walrasian framework, it would seem evident that the adjustment of individual 
prices must be hindered by some sort of costs or constraints; otherwise, even the slightest change 
in an individual firm’s environment would cause a corresponding change in the prices of its 
products. Furthermore, the fact that price changes tend to be quite large—with a median 
adjustment exceeding 10% for many categories of the consumer price index—suggests that a 
firm’s decision to change its price is typically driven by sectoral or firm-specific considerations 
rather than the state of the macroeconomy. 
2.2 Monopolistic Competition Is a Characteristic of Most Product Markets 
Imperfect competition plays a crucial role in providing a rationale for sticky prices. Under 
perfect competition, each good is produced by many identical firms, all of which must charge 
exactly the same price (determined by the marginal cost of production) at every moment in time; 
any firm charging a lower price would operate at a loss, and any firm charging a higher price 
would have no sales at all. In such a market, all firms earn zero profits in equilibrium, and the 
price of the item adjusts continuously in response to even the slightest change in its marginal cost, 5 
 
whether due to a fluctuation in the cost of raw materials, the price of electricity, wages, interest 
rates, or other cause. In contrast, in an environment of monopolistic competition, each individual 
firm’s products are distinct from those of its competitors. In this case, the firm can earn positive 
profits by charging a price for each item that incorporates a positive markup; that is, the price of 
the item exceeds its marginal cost of production. The widespread incidence of markup pricing 
was originally highlighted by the survey of Hall and Hitch (1939), who found that “an 
overwhelming majority of the entrepreneurs thought that a price based on full average cost 
(including a conventional allowance for profit) was the ‘right’ price, the one which ‘ought’ to be 
charged.” Along similar lines, Okun (1981) indicated that “the setting of prices by marking up 
costs is a good first approximation to actually observed behavior in most areas of industry, trade, 
and transportation.” 
Of course, because the profit maximizing level of the markup depends on the elasticity of 
demand and on the relative prices of its competitors, the firm’s optimal price will vary over time 
in response to these factors, as well as in response to movements in marginal cost. However, a 
crucial insight of the New Keynesian approach is that a monopolistic competition framework 
combined with unsynchronized price setting implies that the firm does not have to adjust its price 
instantaneously in response to changes in marginal cost or the prices of its competitors: the firm 
still has substantial sales even if its price is a bit too high, and still earns positive profits even if its 
price is a bit too low. 
The survey evidence provides strong support for the view that imperfect competition 
characterizes most product markets in the euro area. First, only about one-fourth of the firms 
report that their prices are primarily set to match the prices of their competitors—as one might 
expect in the case of a perfectly competitive market—and roughly the same proportion of firms 
indicate that a price reduction by at least one competitor would be considered “highly important” 
in determining whether the firm should cut its own price. In contrast, roughly half of the firms 
describe their prices as being determined by a markup over unit variable cost—consistent with the 6 
 
stylized assumption of a monopolistically competitive market with a constant elasticity of 
demand—whereas the remainder indicate that their prices are determined by a different approach 
that is still suggestive of imperfect competition, perhaps with a more complex elasticity of 
demand. 
Second, roughly two-thirds of the firms in these surveys indicated that long-term customers 
accounted for the bulk of their sales. The predominance of long-term relationships is entirely 
consistent with product differentiation and specialization, but would be virtually inconceivable in 
a perfectly competitive market (such as that observed for commodities such as gold) where the 
match between an individual buyer and an individual seller is random and transitory. 
Third, it should be noted that only about 20% of the firms in these surveys report that the 
price of their main product is the same for all customers, as one would expect in a perfectly 
competitive market. The remaining 80% indicate that the actual price of their main product varies 
across customers, either on a case-by-case basis or as a function of the quantity sold. It should be 
noted that this pattern of price discrimination does not fit neatly into the stylized framework of 
monopolistic competition, which implies that all customers pay the same price for a given item at 
a given point in time (just as in the case of perfect competition). Nevertheless, this survey 
evidence is certainly consistent with the notion that most product markets comprise highly 
differentiated goods and services and hence exhibit relatively complex forms of imperfect 
competition. 
Finally, as reported in Fabiani et al. (2007), the perceived degree of market competition is 
statistically significant in explaining cross-sectional variations in the use of markup pricing 
strategies and in the frequency of price reviews and changes; this evidence highlights the 
thorough implications of interactions between imperfect competition and nominal price rigidity 
(for instance, due to the existence of implicit and explicit contracts, menu costs, informational 
problems, unsynchronized price setting, or interaction between price and wage setting).7 
 
3. Evidence on Competing Theories of Price Setting Behavior 
The recent micro evidence is also invaluable for performing an empirical assessment of 
various theories of price setting behavior, especially because many of these theories are difficult 
to distinguish based on macroeconomic data alone. 
3.1 Downward Nominal Price Rigidity 
This theory reflects the notion that firms may be reluctant to reduce the nominal prices of 
their products, perhaps because a cut in the nominal price would send an adverse signal to 
customers regarding a decline in the quality of the product. This form of nominal inertia might be 
inconsequential in an economy with high aggregate inflation, because a firm seeking to reduce its 
relative price could do so without actually cutting its nominal price. In contrast, in an economy 
with low aggregate inflation, one might observe an asymmetric pattern of price increases for 
those firms seeking to raise their relative price, and unchanged prices for the remaining firms that 
are constrained by the downward nominal rigidity. Nevertheless, this mechanism is generally 
inconsistent with the micro evidence. In the euro area, price reductions comprise roughly 40% of 
all changes in consumer prices and roughly 45% of all changes in producer prices, and the 
average magnitude of price cuts is nearly identical to the magnitude of price hikes; similar 
patterns are also evident in retail price data for the United States
8. And even these modest 
asymmetries may simply reflect the influence of a non-zero aggregate inflation rate. Furthermore, 
surveys in the euro area obtained little support for the notion that firms are reluctant to cut their 
prices due to fears that customers will make judgments about product quality based on price; 
indeed, this hypothesis was dismissed out of hand by the respondents in the survey conducted for 
the United States. 
Finally, it should be noted that asymmetry in price setting is somewhat more evident in the 
service sector, where price decreases only account for about 20% of all price changes. This 
outcome might simply reflect upward trends in the price of services relative to consumer goods 
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(corresponding to underlying sectoral differences in productivity growth), as well as lower 
volatility of shocks to the service sector. Alternatively, because labor costs constitute a high share 
of total cost in many service industries, the apparent asymmetry in the adjustment of service 
prices might result from downward nominal wage rigidity; thus, further research is evidently 
needed to investigate these hypotheses. 
3.2 Smoothing Models of Price Adjustment 
Suppose that the typical firm incurs convex adjustment costs whenever it changes the 
nominal price of its product; that is, these adjustment costs rise at an increasing rate as a function 
of the absolute magnitude of the price change. Given these adjustment costs, the firm’s optimal 
price setting behavior involves smooth and gradual adjustments, implying a persistent series of 
small consecutive adjustments rather than sudden large movements in either direction
9. As shown 
by Rotemberg (1982), convex adjustment costs provide elegant microeconomic foundations for 
the New Keynesian Phillips Curve; thus, this approach has subsequently been used in numerous 
analytical and empirical studies. Despite its elegance and tractability, its implications are clearly 
inconsistent with the micro evidence. First, as noted above, both retail and producer prices tend to 
be adjusted relatively infrequently (apart from the unprocessed food and energy sectors). 
Furthermore, as emphasized in Fabiani et al. (2007), the average magnitude of individual price 
adjustments is quite large: about 8% for consumer price increases, and roughly 10% for consumer 
price reductions. 
3.3 Sticky Information 
Mankiw and Reis (2002) have proposed an alternative framework in which information 
collection and processing is subjective to substantial fixed costs, whereas the actual adjustment of 
prices is completely costless. With sticky information and costless price adjustment, the firm’s 
optimal strategy—apart from certain extraordinary circumstances—is to perform a relatively 
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infrequent updating of its information set and then reoptimize the intended trajectory for its 
nominal price. This optimal trajectory typically involves some price adjustment in every period, 
but the trajectory itself remains settled until the next time that the firm updates its information set. 
As shown by Mankiw and Reis (2002), sticky information yields implications for aggregate 
inflation dynamics that differ from those of the benchmark New Keynesian Phillips Curve in 
several important respects
10. 
However, micro evidence is generally inconsistent with this form of price adjustment. As 
previously noted, most retail and producer prices are adjusted relatively infrequently, rather than 
changing every period as in the sticky information model. Furthermore, firm-level surveys in the 
euro area and several other industrial economies have consistently found that the respondents do 
not perceive that costly information plays a significant role in their price setting decisions. 
Indeed, the euro area surveys indicate that the frequency of price review generally exceeds the 
frequency of price changes; that is, many price reviews do not result in a price change. 
Of course, as with each of the other mechanisms considered here, the sticky information 
hypothesis almost certainly contains some important grains of truth that should be incorporated 
into a more nuanced price setting framework. For example, the euro area surveys find that 
forward-looking considerations play little or no role in the price reviews of a substantial 
proportion of respondents, perhaps due to difficulties in constructing or updating forecasts on a 
regular basis. In addition, it could well be the case that some of these price reviews are mainly 
oriented toward product-specific news and place insufficient emphasis on changes in the 
macroeconomic outlook. These issues deserve further investigation, perhaps even involving a 
new set of firm-level surveys. 
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3.4 Staggered Nominal Contracts 
Much of the New Keynesian literature has proceeded under the assumption that the price of 
each product is specified by an explicit or implicit multiperiod contract with the firm’s customers, 
who can purchase any desired quantity of the product at the specified price throughout the 
duration of the contract. Following the seminal work of Taylor (1999) and Calvo (1983), the 
timing of new contracts is assumed to be evenly staggered across firms and to be invariant to 
changes in the aggregate economy; thus, a constant fraction of all price contracts are reset at each 
point in time
11. Furthermore, the staggered contract structure implies that an aggregate demand 
shock (such as shift in the stance of monetary policy) will have effects on real economic activity 
that last longer than the duration of the typical contract. 
The micro evidence is broadly consistent with some aspects of the staggered contracts 
framework. First, as we have already discussed, many retail and producer prices are adjusted only 
once or twice a year, and these adjustments tend to be staggered fairly evenly throughout the year 
(although some seasonality is observed in certain sectors). Second, most surveys of price setting 
managers indicate that nominal contracts play a key role in explaining why prices are not adjusted 
more frequently; indeed, implicit and explicit contracts were ranked as the two most important 
explanations by the respondents of the euro area surveys reported in this book. Finally, the 
evidence from disaggregated price records suggests that the overall frequency of price adjustment 
is reasonably stable, at least in environments of low and stable aggregate inflation
12. 
Nevertheless, the micro evidence directly contradicts the notion that price setting behavior can be 
generally characterized by staggered contracts with a fixed duration, as in the analysis of Taylor 
(1999)
13. 
The basic problem here is not the observed degree of sectoral heterogeneity in the 
frequency of price adjustment: although Taylor’s original formulation assumed an identical 
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duration for all contracts, that formulation has subsequently been generalized to allow the 
contract duration to vary across different groups of firms
14. Rather, the fixed duration approach is 
clearly inconsistent with the findings of Aucremanne and Dhyne (2005), namely, relatively large 
variation in the duration of price spells for individual items in almost every product category in 
the consumer price index; that is, the interval between price changes tends to vary quite widely 
over time, even for a single item sold by an individual firm. Of course, it should be emphasized 
that fixed duration contracts may still provide a useful framework for modeling the determination 
of wages, especially in economies where labor unions represent a large fraction of the labor force. 
The micro evidence appears somewhat more consistent with the assumption that price contracts 
have a random duration that is invariant to the state of the aggregate economy, as in Calvo (1983) 
and numerous subsequent studies. In the special case where every firm faces the same probability 
in every period of being able to reset its price contract (regardless of how long its current contract 
has already lasted), this approach provides elegant and tractable foundations for the New 
Keynesian Phillips Curve
15. 
To capture the sectoral heterogeneity noted above, the random duration contracting 
framework can be readily extended to permit the adjustment probability to vary across broad 
groups of firms
16. Furthermore, in contrast to the counterfactual predictions of the fixed duration 
framework, Aucremanne and Dhyne (2005) have found that Calvo style contracts yield roughly 
accurate predictions regarding the relationship between the mean duration and the coefficient of 
variation of individual price spells for most of the narrow categories of items in the consumer 
price index (apart from food and energy). 
However, the recent evidence also highlights the extent to which the random duration 
contracting framework does not provide sufficiently deep microeconomic foundations for the 
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analysis of price setting behavior. First, this framework starts from the premise that the contract 
adjustment probability is a fixed parameter, without providing any interpretation for the extent to 
which the average duration of price spells varies markedly across different sectors of the 
economy and even across narrow product categories within each sector
17. Nor does this 
framework provide any means of understanding the apparent differences in the frequency of price 
adjustment across major industrial economies, e.g. the euro area compared with the United States. 
Furthermore, surveys indicate that the timing of price adjustments typically reflects the incidence 
of substantial changes in production costs or the level of demand
18. Finally, the rapid response of 
prices to specific macroeconomic events (such as indirect tax increases or the euro cash 
changeover) or shifts in monetary policy regime (such as a decline in aggregate inflation) 
demonstrates that the frequency of price adjustment is not invariant to the state of the aggregate 
economy. Clearly, accounting for this evidence requires a framework with elements of state-
dependent pricing and some combination of idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. 
3.5 Menu Costs and State-Dependent Pricing 
Now suppose that the typical firm incurs a fixed cost (menu cost) whenever it changes the 
nominal price of its product; that is, the adjustment cost is invariant to the absolute magnitude of 
the price change, as well as to its sign (positive or negative). Given this fixed cost of adjustment, 
the firm will generally choose to leave its price unchanged until a single large firm-specific or 
sector-specific shock (or perhaps a sequence of smaller shocks) causes its optimal price to deviate 
sufficiently far from its actual price, at which point the firm resets its actual price to match the 
optimal one
19. 
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The micro evidence is broadly consistent with several key predictions of the menu cost 
framework: most prices tend to remain constant for an extended period and then change by a 
relatively large magnitude, and these characteristics are essentially symmetric for both positive 
and negative price adjustments. Indeed, Danziger (1999) and Golosov and Lucas (2003) have 
shown that the underlying parameters of the model can be calibrated to yield empirically 
reasonable values for the frequency and magnitude of price adjustments; Gertler and Leahy 
(2005) modify some of the auxiliary assumptions and then proceed to demonstrate that this 
framework can provide a satisfactory accounting for aggregate inflation dynamics and the 
persistent real effects of monetary disturbances. 
It should be noted, however, that the micro evidence also highlights several dimensions for 
refinement and further development of the menu cost framework. First, although the average 
magnitude of price changes is quite large, it is nonetheless apparent that small price adjustments 
are also very common; this characteristic was initially noted by Carlton (1986) and Kashyap 
(1995) for specific retail items, but the recent micro evidence reveals the same pattern for 
virtually every item in the consumer price index. Specific assumptions about the idiosyncratic 
shock process might account for these small price adjustments, but it also seems plausible that the 
menu cost itself may exhibit cross sectional variation—related to firms’ size and other 
characteristics—and perhaps also seasonal or business cycle variations. 
Furthermore, the notion of literal “menu costs” is clearly inconsistent with the micro 
evidence. For example, Kashyap (1995) documented that the prices of many individual items 
remain unchanged across multiple editions of a retailer’s catalog—an outcome that is evidently 
unrelated to typesetting or printing costs—and many barbershops and other small retailers have 
no printed pricelist at all. Furthermore, the incidence of temporary sales and promotions (after 
which the price returns to its previous level) cannot be easily explained in terms of a fixed cost of 
posting new prices. Finally, firm-level surveys in the euro area and other industrial economies 
have consistently found that “physical costs of adjustment” do not play a significant role in price-14 
 
setting decisions. Thus, further research is needed to identify other sources of friction with 
implications broadly similar to those of fixed menu costs. 
4. Implications for Monetary Policy 
When considering the policy implications of analytical or empirical research, it is advisable 
to draw lessons that are robust to a variety of modeling approaches and econometric methods, 
rather than relying on any particular formalization of the economy
20. Thus, rather than trying to 
formulate any precise guidance for policymakers, we now focus on several broad lessons that can 
be inferred from the micro evidence. 
4.1 The Monetary Transmission Mechanism 
In the idealized Walrasian framework with competitive markets and flexible prices, the 
central bank may define the unit of account but its actions have no substantive effect on real 
economic activity; that is, monetary policy is completely “neutral” in such an environment. In 
contrast, as discussed above, the recent micro evidence makes it plausible to argue in favor of the 
New Keynesian view that monetary policy exhibits short-run non-neutrality due to the influence 
of imperfect competition and sticky prices, and hence that the conduct of monetary policy can 
have significant consequences for the evolution of the real economy. The intuition for this 
implication is quite straightforward: when prices are sticky, the central bank can implement a 
change in the policy rate and thereby affect real interest rates and hence the level of real 
aggregate expenditures
21. 
In addition, recent analysis has highlighted the extent to which the frequency of price 
adjustment can play a key role in determining the short-run response of inflation to a shift in real 
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economic activity. Indeed, in a comparison of the macroeconomic dynamics of the euro area vis-
à-vis the United States, Altissimo et al. (2006) have found that the persistence of the inflation 
response to a cost push shock is quite similar for both economies, and the higher persistence of 
the euro area output gap response can be largely explained by the lower frequency of adjustment 
of prices in the euro area
22. 
4.2 The Case for Price Stability 
The recent evidence also highlights the benefits of maintaining price stability over the 
medium run—an aspect of the New Keynesian approach that was largely missing from the “old 
Keynesian” analysis that reached a heyday in the 1950s and 1960s. In particular, the earlier 
analysis placed relatively little emphasis on the social costs of inflation (especially compared with 
the social costs of unemployment) and typically assumed a long-run downward sloping Phillips 
Curve, implying that the optimal monetary policy might involve a higher average level of 
inflation in exchange for a permanent reduction in the unemployment rate. 
In contrast, the New Keynesian framework not only incorporates the long-run neutrality of 
money—whereby a permanent rise in the stock of money eventually generates a corresponding 
rise in the price level, and hence has no long-run real effects—but also emphasizes the degree to 
which price stickiness reflects underlying costs, thus implying that a permanent rise in the growth 
rate of money has adverse long-run effects on the real economy by distorting relative prices and 
wasting resources through excessively frequent price adjustments
23. 
4.3 The Role of Expectations 
Finally, the micro evidence provides substantial support for the view that establishing 
credible policies and managing private sector expectations are crucial aspects of modern central 
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banking
24. In particular, in an environment with infrequent price changes, each firm has a strong 
incentive to assess not only current factors but also the future outlook whenever it resets its price. 
Euro area surveys largely reinforce this view: about half of the firms report that forward-looking 
considerations play an important role in their price setting behavior, whereas about one-third of 
them indicate that their assessments are mainly backward looking. 
Along these lines, it should be emphasized that the credibility of a monetary policy regime 
oriented toward price stability is also helpful for stabilizing the economy in response to economic 
disturbances and hence improves the tradeoff between the variability of inflation and the 
volatility of other important macroeconomic variables such as output and employment. However, 
imperfect credibility may be associated with shocks to inflation—caused by “inflation scares” or 
revised beliefs about the central bank’s inflation objective—that may be quite costly to reverse in 
terms of foregone real economic activity. Moreover, the higher the degree of nominal rigidity, the 
higher this sacrifice ratio. 
5. Directions for Further Research 
Recent research reveals a negative relation between the frequency of price changes and the 
importance of wages as a fraction of costs. In particular, the IPN found that those sectors with a 
higher labor share, such as services, are typically characterized by a lower frequency of price 
changes. This suggests that it is essential to look at wage setting in order to understand price 
dynamics. Given the crucial importance that labor market behavior assumes in explaining 
business cycle dynamics and the pervasiveness of elements of structural rigidity in labor markets 
in the euro area, further research is warranted. Empirical research is needed to establish the 
relevant facts about wage setting. Theoretical research is necessary to incorporate a structural 
representation of labor markets into stochastic general equilibrium models of growth and business 
cycles. A new Eurosystem research network on wage dynamics has recently been initiated to shed 
further light on these issues. 
                                                  
24 See Goodfriend and King (1997, 2001), Clarida et al. (1999), and Woodford (2003). 17 
 
In more general terms, the findings from the surveys constitute a challenge to researchers. 
The availability of high-quality micro datasets holds the promise of stimulating researchers to 
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